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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Admiralty-Limitation of Liability-Vessel Cast Ashore
by Act of God
In the recent case of Wong v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.,' a federal
district court denied a petition for limitation of liability where a private
vessel had been cast by a tidal wave onto the plaintiff's property. The
defendant insurance company declared the boat a total loss, refused to
let the boat owner accept an offer he had for removal, took an assignment of salvage rights, and thereafter made attempts to sell the hulk.
Upon defendant's refusal to remove the wreck, plaintiff landowner
brought an action for removal and for trespass damages resulting from
the failure to remove. Defendant's petition for limitation was denied
upon procedural grounds ;2 however, this Note will be limited to the
substantive issue of the right to limit liability where a vessel is cast
ashore by an Act of God.
3
Limitation of liability is a federally created right over which the
4
Basically, it enables a
admiralty courts have exclusive jurisdiction.
shipowner to limit his liability to the value of his ship and pending
freight 5 after the complained of incident,6 where, without privity or
knowledge7 of the owner, his vessel causes personal injury or property
damage to another. This limitation is permitted even though the shipowner may be fully indemnified through insurance for the loss of his
vessel.8 Although the original purpose of the limitation doctrine was to
foster the commerce and business of the sea, 9 it is now settled that the
'167 F. Supp. 230 (D. Hawaii 1958).
defendant had failed to comply with Admiralty Rule 51, 28 U.S.C. §
2073 (1952) and 49 STAT. 1480 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1952), requiring the
2The

petitioner to pay into court, or transfer to a trustee, the minimum value of his
interest in the vessel.
'REv. STAT. §§ 4283-89 (1875), 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-89 (1952).
'Langes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531 (1931); In re Great Lakes Transit Corp.,
63 F.2d 849 (6th Cir. 1933) ; The Aloha, 56 F.2d 647 (W.D. Wash. 1932).
' Pending freight refers to the earnings of the voyage. The Black Eagle, 87
F.2d 891, 894 (2d Cir. 1937).
City of Norwich v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) ; The
C. F. Coughlin, 25 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.N.Y. 1938).
"The privity or knowledge that excludes the operation of this section must
be actual, in the sense of knowledge or authorization, or immediate control of the
wrongful acts or conditions, or through some kind of personal participation in
them." The Oneida, 282 Fed. 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1922). For a discussion of this
term and its applicability, see GiLMORE AND BLACK, ADMuIALTY §§ 10-20 to -26

(1957).

8 City of Norwich v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468 (1886) ; The
Pere Marquette 18, 203 Fed. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1913).
o Moore v. American Transp. Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1 (1861).
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privilege extends to the owners of pleasure yachts and other water
craft. 10
The doctrine of limitation of liability is equally applicable whether
the damages are consummated on land'1 or on navigable waters, and
regardless of the location of the ship causing the damage. 1 2 The courts
have reasoned that the exercise of the privilege is no longer dependent
on whether the tort is maritime or nonmaritime, but rather is a privilege
given to all shipowners ipso facto, and it is not required that the
plaintiff's cause of action be grounded in admiralty for the shipowner to
avail himself of this privilege.' 8
Since the privilege of limitation is available to all shipowners, there
would appear to be no question of its availability to a defendant whose
ship had been negligently navigated or cast upon a plaintiff's property
causing damages thereon. Defendant would, of course, be liable for the
trespass damage, but only to the extent of his limited liability so long as
the trespass was without privity or knowledge. However, once the
unabandoned vessel is on plaintiff's property and there has been an
unheeded demand for removal, defendant is precluded from limiting his
liability for damages occurring after the demand because the damages
are now caused with privity or knowledge of the owner.14
The preceding background has involved situations where there was
an existing liability on the boatowner, and the question was whether
this should have been a limited liability. Since it is generally accepted
that there is no liability for the Acts of God, 15 and since the initial
damages in the principal case were caused by an Act of God, it is clear
that there was no liability on the boatowner for the original damage.
Thus the question presented by Wong is whether there is a liability
10 Petition of Liebler, 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y. 1937) ; 49 STAT. 1480 (1936),
46 U.S.C. § 188 (1953).
" Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U.S. 96 (1911) (barge collided with the abutment
of a railroad drawbridge). The Irving F. Ross, 8 F.2d 313 (D. Mass. 1923)
(ashes from a barge impaired the flow of a factory's drainage pipes).
12 In two relatively recent cases the vessels were in winter storage, on land,
and caused injuries when they exploded while agents of the owners were performing
maintenance on them. In the Matter of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73
(D. 3 Conn. 1954) ; The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271 (D. Mass. 1941).
i BENEDICT, AmERICAN ADMIRALTY § 116 (6th ed. 1940).
"In re Pennsylvania R.R., 48 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 640
(1931). In this case a barge which had negligently broken loose washed ashore
and was causing damage to a boardwalk. The barge owners, although still
claiming title, made no effort to remove the barge for four days after notice was
given to them, and the court held that they consequently had lost the right to
limit liability.
"In Louisville Ry. v. Sweeney, 157 Ky. 620, 163 S.W. 739 (1914), it was
said that one who trespasses upon another and inflicts an injury is liable for the
injury unless caused by the Act of God or produced by causes beyond his control.
"A tornado lifts A's properly constructed house from A's land and deposits it on
B's land. This is not a trespass." RESTATEmENT, TORTS § 158, comment e,
illustration (2) (1934).
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arising after knowledge of the results of this Act of God, and if so,
16
can it then be limited.
It has been held that an owner of goods may abandon them when
they have been cast onto another's property by an inevitable accident.'1
It has likewise been held that the landowner has the right to remove
goods so placed on his property, and that upon the chattel owner's
reclaiming them there arises an implied contract to pay for the cost of
such removal. 8 In Livezey v. Philadelphia,'9 a case similar to the
principal case, but one in which the right to limit liability was not at
issue, the position was taken that even for a failure to remove after
notice it was not essential to immunity that the chattel owner or his
vendee should abandon their interest in the chattel. In that case a
bridge had washed onto the plaintiff's land as a result of a flood, and
the court, in recognizing that there was an assertion of a claim to the
property, said that neither the chattel owner nor his vendee could create
a liability for a wrong which they had not committed, and for the consequences of which they could not have been made originally to answer.
The court in the principal case, by dictum, took a position diametrically opposed to the Livezey case and indicated that an abandonment
would have been necessary to immunity from a subsequent trespass
liability. It was reasoned that the defendant had exercised such dominion
and control over the wreck that its claim for abandonment could not be
sustained, and that it had become a purchaser of the wreck in its then
existing condition. It seems to follow that the defendant, with full
knowledge of the surrounding circumstances, assumed a duty of removal
and consequent responsibility for the trespass damages resulting from
the failure to remove. Thus it appears that the defendant assumed the
subsequent liability with privity or knowledge as to bar the right to
limit liability.
"8 The duty and obligation of a shipowner to remove sunken or wrecked
vessels from navigable waters is specifically covered by a federal statute and
has no apparent bearing to the problem at hand. The Wreck Act, 30 STAT. 1152
(1894), 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1953). This act provides that when a vessel is sunk or
wrecked in navigable waters the owner shall mark it, and must maintain such
marks until the sunken craft is removed or abandoned; a failure to prosecute
immediate removal will be construed as an abandonment. In Petition of Highlands
Nay. Corp., 29 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1928), the vessels in question had sunk by a pier
in navigable waters without fault of the owner. A city ordinance required shipowners to remove such sunken or abandoned vessels or else the city would do it
and assess the costs against the owners. It was held that the Wreck Act
recognized the right of abandonment given by the general maritime law and that
the owner intending to abandon could not be held liable for the cost of raising
after abandonment. Accord, City of Newark v. Mills, 35 F.2d 110 (3d Cir. 1929),
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 722 (1930) ; The Central States, 9 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y.
1935?.
,Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co., 16 Pa. 393 (1851).
See also, Annot., 41
A.L.R. 1015 (1926).
"' Tome v. DuBois, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 548 (1867). See also, Annot., 55 Am.
Dec. 508 (1886).
" 64 Pa. 106 (1870).
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There is an appalling lack of authority on the problem of whether
there can be a subsequent liability on an owner of chattels cast ashore
by an Act of God. Regardless of how this problem is resolved it does
not appear that the case will be ripe for a limitation of liability. If there
is a subsequent liability the defendant will be faced with privity or
20
knowledge; if there is not a liability there is no cause to limit.
WALTON

K. JOYNER

Corporations-Corporate Action for Mismanagement Precluded
Where Sole Stockholder Has No Standing in Equity to Sue
Park Terrace, Inc. v. Burge,1 a recent case of first impression, has
added a third decision to the Park Terrace litigation.2 In the present
case the two defendants had been original shareholders of Park Terrace, Inc. The capital structure of the corporation provided that one
class of stock would be called "preferred." All the shares of this class
were held by the Federal Housing Administration. In addition there
were two other classes of stock, Class A and Class B. The Class B

"0"The doctrine of limitation of liability presupposes that a liability exists
which is to be limited, but if no liability exists, there is nothing to limit." In the
Matter of Cherokee Trawler Corp., 157 F. Supp. 414, 419 (E.D. Va. 1957).
1249 N.C. 308, 106 S.E.2d 478 (1959).
Action was commenced on November
3, 1953.
'The first case, Lester v. McLean, 242 N.C. 390, 87 S.E.2d 886 (1955), involved a claim of alleged fraud raised by McLean as a defense to an action
brought by the two defendants in the principal case to recover the purchase price
of the Class A stock. The court found that there had been no fraud and rendered
judgment against McLean.
The second case, Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 241 N.C. 473,
85 S.E.2d 677 (1955), remanded on rehearing,243 N.C. 595, 91 S.E.2d 584 (1956),
concerned an action brought by the corporation against a building construction
company owned by the two defendants in the principal case for alleged failure
to build the housing in accordance with FHA specifications. On rehearing the
court handed down a unique opinion stating that the legal entity of the corporation was suspended when the number of stockholders was reduced to less than three.
This decision was widely criticized. Latty, A Conceptualistic Tangle and the
One- and Two-Mat Corporation, 34 N.C.L. REv. 471 (1956).
After this decision the North Carolina Legislature enacted a statute which provided that the
existence of a corporation was not impaired by the acquistion of all the shares by
one or two persons. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-3.1 (Supp. 1957). N.C. Sess. Laws
1957, ch. 550, § 31/2, in referring to the amending act, provides: "This Act shall
not affect adjudicated rights." In light of this provision, it seems possible to
argue that the legal entity of Park Terrace, Inc. was suspended for all purposes
by the decision in Park Terrace, Inc. v. Phoenix, vtupra, and thus that the
"corporation" would have no standing to bring this present action. However, it
is submitted that § 3r2 was included only to preclude relitigation by the "corporation" against Phoenix, and was not intended to affect its status with respect to
other rights. Thus, Park Terrace, Inc. would be deemed to have had "uninterrupted existence and to have possessed uninterrupted capacity to act as a corporation" in all respects, limited only by the fact that the corporation's rights have been
adjudicated as against Phoenix.
' In this manner FHA could step in and control the corporation in the event
of default in the mortgage which it insured. Upon payment of the mortgage
debt, the preferred stock could be redeemed at any time by the corporation.

